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Abstract
There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we
show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is
in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly
can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between
different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms
from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to
those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing
simulation for different distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs
(much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across
all traders in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we address the critical question: how and how well competition on the mar-
kets handles the fundamental problems of information. With imperfect information, market
actions or choices convey information and we know from earlier work (e.g. Rothschild and
Stiglitz, 1976) that inefficiency and even existence problems can arise in competitive markets
because the slight change in the action of the informed side of the market discretely changes
beliefs of the other side of the market. While information asymmetries inevitably arise, the
extent to which they do so and their consequences on the realization of the gains from trade
depend on how the market is structured. This raises the fundamental question of the interplay
between two forms of market imperfections: imperfect information and imperfect competition.
There is no particular reason why competition should be better in the presence of imperfect
information. The simplest way by which this would not be true is when the firm could exploit
its market power to relax the incentive constraints.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency of competition on the insurance market
in the presence of adverse selection. Using the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), we contrast the competitive equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equilibrium out-
come a` la Stiglitz (1977) and we compare their relative efficiency. Following Rustichini et
al. (1994), the (expected) efficiency of an equilibrium is the fraction whose numerator is the
expected gains from trade across all traders in the equilibrium and whose denominator is the
gains from trade across all traders with full information. Using this criterion we compare the
monopoly outcome with one seller of insurance contracts and many potential buyers with dif-
ferent risks against the competitive outcome imposing zero profit on each contract that might
be offered in equilibrium. With a continuum of types it is well known that a competitive
equilibrium a` la Rothschild-Stiglitz does not exist. To address this issue, some alternative
equilibrium concepts, based either on game theoretic refinements or on a Walrasian approach,
have been proposed in order to ensure the existence of competitive equilibria. Even though no
general agreement has been reached so far about the equilibrium concept, the general intuition
in the classical as well as more recent literature is that competition typically results in the
provision of a set of contracts that fully separate types (Chiappori, 2006). In this paper we
refer to the concept of reactive equilibrium developed by Riley (1979) and Engers and Fernan-
dez (1987) for which the Pareto-dominant full separating zero-profit outcome is the unique
reactive equilibrium.1
The key finding is that the monopoly outcome, in general, is more efficient than the com-
petitive outcome (according to our expected efficiency criterion). The reason why monopoly
performs better than competition is that the monopolist can exploit its market power to offer
contracts that better satisfy the incentive constraints. More precisely, the monopolist can offer
contracts with implicit transfers across agent types that can relax the incentive constraints and
1This is also the equilibrium allocation achieved in a Walrasian equilibrium (Bisin and Gottardi, 2006). See
also Hellwig (1987) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) for other equilibrium concepts leading to the same
resource allocation.
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implement a larger set of allocations. This is one of many examples of the interplay between
market imperfections (see Jaffe and Stiglitz, 1990; Stiglitz, 1975). The economy, in effect has
to trade off between two different imperfections: imperfections of information or imperfections
of competition, with no particular reason that these imperfections will be balanced optimally.
As we shall see, competition provides all risk types with an insurance contract, but coverage
is only partial. On the contrary, under monopoly low risk types are forced to quit the market,
but coverage increases for the participating risk types.
Our paper continues a line of research begun by Stiglitz (1977), who analyzed monopoly
insurance markets, and compared the equilibrium outcome with the (two-type) competitive
outcome. In his qualitative comparison Stiglitz shows how the high-risk consumers always buy
full coverage at a price larger than the fair premium, while the low risks buy partial insurance,
both under monopoly and competition. A further qualitative comparison is performed by
Dahlby (1987) in the same two-type framework and shows that monopoly may be better than
competition when there are enough low types. In our analysis with a continuum of types we
show that monopoly performs better than competition for almost any possible distribution of
risk types, and not only in the case of a large proportion of low-risk types; i.e., when insurance
generates little surplus.2
We perform this analysis in a non-expected utility framework using the dual theory ap-
proach to choice under risk developed by Yaari (1987). It turns out that by using this specifica-
tion of individual preferences we are able to provide a clear-cut comparison between monopoly
and competition. The dual theory has the property that utility is linear in income, and risk
aversion is expressed entirely by a transformation of probabilities in which bad outcomes are
given relatively higher weights and good outcomes are given relatively lower weights. In our
simple two-state model the probability of bad outcome is weighted up by a loading factor. It
would be absurd to suggest that the dual theory provides a better model than the expected
utility. The latter has obvious appeal and has provided so many useful results in insurance
theory. Nonetheless, we feel there is some gain from studying the properties of our simple
non-expected utility model, even if only to derive some clear insights on the efficiency of
competition in the presence of adverse selection.3
A similar approach is used by Attar et al. (2011) who analyze a model of adverse selection
a` la a` la Akerlof (1970) but with divisible goods. As in our model, they consider agents with
linear preferences both on quantities (which is coverage in insurance markets) and money.
2In a different setting, a labour market where workers suffer from social comparison, von Siemens (2012)
analyzes the competitive equilibrium when workers’ ability is private information. He shows that competition
between firms generate rent extraction by skilled workers, which in turn increases inequality and may provoke
inefficient sorting into unemployment. If there is only one firm in the economy, this monopsonist can reduce
rent extraction by skilled workers and the differences in the wage workers receive. Interestingly, it is the firm’s
ability to perform cross-subsidization that increases the efficiency of the monopsonist equilibrium.
3Another distinctive property of insurance under dual theory is that the demand of insurance cannot decrease
with wealth. In contrast, the expected utility model makes the comparison between competition and monopoly
difficult since by charging a higher premium (relative to competition) for a given coverage the monopoly
increases the marginal willingness to pay for insurance.
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However, they focus on nonexclusive contracts and show that, contrary to our result, the
competitive equilibrium entails extreme choices for the agents depending on their type: either
the whole endowment is sold or no treed occurs (in the insurance setting this equilibrium would
be that some types get full insurance and all the other types do not buy any coverage). In the
present paper, where we focus on exclusive contracts, we show that the competitive equilibrium
is characterized by a continuum of partial coverage contract monotonically increasing with
the risk type of the agent and only the highest risk type gets full coverage. It is only under
monopoly that we have a result qualitatively similar to Attar et al. (2011): a pool of high risk
types buys a full coverage contract, while all the other types buy no contract at all.
A line of research that is closely related to non-expected utility theory considers the distor-
tion in the probabilities as a result of biased beliefs of the agents. In this framework, Sandroni
and Squintani (2007, 2012) analyze the monopoly and competitive equilibria in an insurance
market where overconfidence of (a subset of) consumers alters the behavior of otherwise stan-
dard expected utility maximizers in a market a` la Rotschild Stiglitz (1976). They show that
contrary to the standard result, the competitive equilibrium does depend on the composition
of (perceived and actual) risk in the population, while the presence of overconfident agents
is equivalent to a change of the risk composition for the monopoly. They also show that the
competition as well as monopoly can lead to no insurance to low risks individuals, in their
two-type framework. In a more general framework which takes into account both moral haz-
ard and adverse selection problems de Meza and Webb (2001) Jullien et al. (2007) De Donder
and Hindriks (2009) analyze (competitive and monopolistic) screening when more risk averse
individuals exert more preventive care and have also higher willingness to pay for issuance. In
such a case, and contrary to the standard results in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a negative
correlation may (but non necessarily will) arise between risk and insurance. When biased
beliefs are included in such framework, Spinnewijn (2013) provides conditions for positive
and negative correlation between risk and coverage. Interestingly for our analysis, using the
full information case as a benchmark, Spinnewijn (2013) shows that asymmetric information
makes the competitive equilibrium inefficient while, on the contrary, some consumers may
benefit from information asymmetry in a monopolistic market; as a result, heterogeneity in
risk perception may strengthen the scope for public intervention even in competitive markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 contains
the monopolist and competitive equilibria with a continuum of types. In Section 4 simula-
tion results are provided about efficiency of competitive and monopoly markets. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
There are two possible states of the world: the “no accident” state and the “accident” state.
Individuals differ only by their probability of accident, in which case they face a (fixed)
damage d = 1. There is no moral hazard since individuals cannot affect their probability of
accident which is fixed. There is a continuum of risk in the economy distributed according to
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a cumulative probability function F (θ) with density f(θ) > 0 on a closed and compact interval
θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
(with 0 ≤ θ < θ < 1).
Adverse selection is introduced by assuming that individual risk is private information, while
the distribution of risks is common knowledge. We model individuals’ risk preferences using
Yaari (1987)’s dual theory (DT). We first give a general description of this approach before
applying it to our model. Let wealth X be a random variable distributed over [x, x] according
to the distribution function Ψ(x). Yaari’s representation of preferences is dual to the expected
utility theory (EU) in the sense that it is linear in wealth but non linear in probabilities.
Probabilities are transformed by a function Φ(.) defined on the distribution function Ψ(x).4
More precisely, DT preferences over X are given by
V (X) =
∫
x Φ′(Ψ(x)) dΨ(x)
where Φ(0) = 0, Φ(1) = 1 and Φ′(.) > 0. Φ′(.) are non-negative weights adding up to one.
Attitude towards risk is conveyed entirely by the shape of Φ(.). Risk aversion is characterized
by the concavity of Φ(.), i.e. Φ′′(.) < 0. In this case, bad outcomes (with low Ψ(X)) receive
higher weights than good outcomes (with high Ψ(X)). In other words, V (X) is the certainty-
equivalent of X computed as a weighted average of outcomes in which bad outcomes are given
high weight while good outcomes are given low weight. Since V (X) is linear in wealth, this
approach separates attitude towards risk from attitude towards wealth.
We now apply DT to our simple two-state setting. For an individual with wealth w facing
a damage d = 1 with probability θ, an insurance contract {δ, pi} with coverage rate δ ∈ [0, 1]
and premium pi > 0 yields the random variable X = (w−pi− (1− δ), θ;w−pi, 1− θ). We thus
define the utility associated to this insurance contract as
V (θ; δ, pi) = φ(θ)(w − pi − (1− δ)) + (1− φ(θ))(w − pi)
= w − pi − φ(θ)(1− δ) (1)
where risk aversion is represented by φ(θ) > θ (and 1 − φ(θ) < 1 − θ).5 In this paper, we
further assume that φ(θ) = (1 + α)θ, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−θ
θ
(the upper bound guaranteeing
that φ(θ) ≤ 1 ∀θ). Making α independent of w accords with our desire to disentangle risk
aversion from income and will greatly simplify the analysis. Using this formulation, type-θ
utility function from insurance contract {δ, pi} is
V (θ; δ, pi) = ω − pi − (1 + α)(1− δ)θ
where the utility loss from the residual risk (1 − δ)θ is inflated by the markup factor 1 + α.
4Alternatively this probability transformation function could be defined on the decumulative distribution
function 1−Ψ such as in Yaari (1987).
5Note that in our model with a discrete random variable, risk aversion translates into the transformation
of the discrete density function φ(θ) > θ rather than the concave transformation of the distribution function
Φ′′(Ψ) < 0 as for continuous random variable. In both cases risk aversion implies that bad outcomes are given
higher weight and good outcomes lower weight.
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Now, comparing the utility with insurance against the utility without insurance we can define
the reservation premium for each type. This is the premium p˜i(θ) that solves
V (θ; δ, pi) = V (θ; 0, 0)
ω − pi − (1 + α)(1− δ)θ = ω − (1 + α)θ
so that the reservation premium of type θ for coverage δ is:
p˜i(θ; δ) = (1 + α)δθ
Moreover the surplus of the agent is defined as the difference between the reservation price
and the price effectively paid:
S(θ; δ, pi) = p˜i(δ; θ)− pi
= (1 + α)δθ − pi
Assuming pi > 0, with free participation, those agents for which p˜i(θ; δ) < pi will drop out
of the market.
It is straightforward to see that the functions V and S have the Single-Crossing property
in the contract space-(δ, pi), because the marginal value of coverage is increasing in θ.
3 Monopoly versus competition equilibrium outcomes
In this section we study the equilibrium outcomes of monopoly and competition in an insurance
market with a continuum of risks.
The optimization problem of the monopolist is:
max
π(θ),δ(θ)
∫ θ
θ
[pi (θ)− δ (θ) θ] dF (θ)
subject to
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ≥ V (θ; 0, 0) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] (2)
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ≥ V
(
θ; δ
(
θ̂
)
, pi
(
θ̂
))
∀θ, θ̂ ∈ [θ, θ] (3)
where (2) is the set of participation constraints and (3) denotes the set of incentive constraints.
Analyzing the set (2) we can see that
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ≥ V (θ; 0, 0)
must be binding, for otherwise it would be possible to increase pi(θ) ∀θ > θ . This is the
classical monopoly result of full rent extraction at the bottom.
In the following Proposition the monopolist outcome is summarized.
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Proposition 1 In a monopoly insurance market with a continuum of risks, there exists
θ∗ =
1 + α
αh (θ∗)
(4)
with h(.) the non-decreasing hazard rate function, such that the equilibrium contracts are
{δm (θ) , pim (θ)} = {0, 0} ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ∗]
{δm (θ) , pim (θ)} = {1, (1 + α) θ∗} ∀θ ∈
[
θ∗, θ
]
Proof. See Appendix.
Therefore the solution is characterized by a (pooling) contract that offers full coverage to
all θ ≥ θ∗ with a premium extracting the entire surplus from type θ∗ and no insurance to all
θ < θ∗. The equilibrium payoff of type θ under monopoly is:
V (θ; δm (θ) , pim (θ)) = ω − (1 + α) θ ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ∗)
V (θ; δm (θ) , pim (θ)) = ω − (1 + α) θ∗ ∀θ ∈
[
θ∗, θ
]
(5)
Monopolist (per capita) profit is
Πm = (1 + α) θ∗ [1− F (θ∗)]−
∫ θ
θ∗
θdF (θ) (6)
Rewriting h (θ∗) = f(θ
∗)
1−F (θ∗) the pivotal type solves
αθ∗f (θ∗) = (1 + α) (1− F (θ∗))
where the LHS is the revenue loss of an increase in θ∗ due to the non-participation of pivotal
type and the RHS is the revenue gain from charging a higher price on all agents above the
pivotal type θ∗.
The pooling contract performs cross-subsidization among types. In fact, while θ∗-type
individuals are extracted the whole surplus, higher types are left with some rent and may
even pay a premium lower than the fair price.
Shifting to the analysis of competition, it is well known that with a continuum of types
a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. In fact Riley (2001) showed the general non-
existence of the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. This existence problem can be circumvented
by resorting to the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by Riley (1979) and developed
further by Engers and Fernandez (1987). A reactive equilibrium is a set of offers such that
there is no profitable deviation by any firm given that other firms can optimally react to this
deviation by offering new contracts. Engers and Fernandez (1987) provide general conditions,
for which the Pareto-dominant full-separating zero-profit set of contracts is the unique reactive
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equilibrium outcome.6 It turns out that those conditions hold true in our framework.7 The key
element is that firms are deterred to deviate from the full separating equilibrium by the belief
that other firms will react to “skim the cream” and make such initial deviation unprofitable.
The Pareto-dominant fully separating zero-profit competitive equilibrium solves
max
π(.)≥0
δ(.)∈[0,1]
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ∀θ =
[
θ, θ
]
subject to (2), (3) and the additional zero profit constraint:
pi (θ)− δ (θ) θ = 0 ∀θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
(7)
The following Proposition summarizes the result due to Hindriks and De Donder (2003).
Proposition 2 In a competitive insurance market with a continuum of risks, the reactive
equilibrium is characterized by the following set of contracts:
{δc (θ) , pic (θ)} =
{(
θ/θ
) 1
α , θ
(
θ/θ
) 1
α
}
∀θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium payoff of type θ under competition is then:
V (θ; δc (θ) , pic (θ)) = ω − (1 + α) θ + αθ
(
θ/θ
) 1
α ∀θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
(8)
So, while in the monopoly every type θ ∈
[
θ∗, θ
]
gets full insurance, with competition only the
highest-risk individuals obtain full coverage and all the other individuals with lower risk obtain
partial coverage. On the other hand, every θ ∈ [θ, θ∗) gets no insurance with monopoly, while
they are provided at least with partial coverage in the competitive case. Figure 1 compares
equilibrium coverage with monopoly and competition for a given distribution of risks.
The crucial feature of competitive equilibrium is that the set of implementable contracts
is smaller than under monopoly. Since each contract must break even – by the constraint (7)
– no cross-subsidization can be performed among types. As a consequence, the distribution of
risks in the population does not influence the equilibrium outcome. In fact, there is a unique
solution to the problem of maximizing the utility of each type given that every contract must
break even and must be incentive compatible.
6Notice that this set of contracts is the Rothschild-Stiglitz candidate equilibrium. Many other equilibrium
concepts have been put forward, such as those developed by Hellwig (1987), Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002),
and the Walrasian approach developed by Prescott and Townsend (1984), but all implement the same allocation.
7The conditions for existence and uniqueness of a reactive equilibrium in our model are: (1) a continu-
ous probability distribution F (θ); (2) the profit function of insurance firms is continuous, bounded and non
increasing in θ and δ; (3) V (θ; δ, pi) is continuous on Θ × ∆ × Π where ∆ = [0, 1] and Π = [pi, p¯i] with
pi= inf{p˜i(θ; δ) : θ ∈ Θ, δ ∈ ∆} and p¯i = sup{p˜i(θ; δ) : θ ∈ Θ, δ ∈ ∆}, is strictly decreasing in pi and satisfies the
Single-Crossing property; (4) the contract space is a closed set ∆×Π.
7
Coverage under
competition

Coverage under
monopoly
Θ*
Θ
1
∆
Figure 1: Relative coverage rates under competition and monopoly.
In Figure 2 the effect of a change in distribution is depicted: the left panel shows a
positively skewed distribution, while the right panel shows a negatively skewed distribution.
While the coverage function under competition is unchanged, the level of θ∗ in the left panel
is lower than in the right panel. This means that when the distribution of risks is positively
skewed, the monopolist charges a lower premium then when it is negatively skewed. The gain
for the monopolist of including more types in the pooling exceeds the profit loss due to the
reduction in premium.
There is a clear trade-off between participation and coverage in the insurance markets
under monopoly and competition. Monopoly, in fact, ensures full coverage to the individuals
that buy insurance contracts, but this is obtained at the expenses of low risk types that do
not participate. Under competition, on the other hand, each individual is provided with an
insurance contract, but coverage is only partial. As a consequence, there is no clear analytical
result when we compare monopoly and competition. We need to perform numerical simulations
on the distribution of individuals and the next Section provides the results.
4 Relative efficiency
In this section we perform some numerical simulations using Beta(a, b) distribution of risks
which gives much flexibility on the shape of the distribution. Indeed, if a > 1 and b > 1 the
distribution is unimodal; if a < 1 and b < 1 the distribution is U-shaped; if a = 1 and b = 1
the distribution is uniform. The degree of skewness increases with the difference |a− b|. The
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Figure 2: The effect of different distributions on coverage and participation under competition
and monopoly.
b
a 1 2 3 5 10
1 20.00 11.11 7.87 5.29 3.46
2 33.33 22.09 17.05 12.41 8.59
3 42.86 31.35 25.54 19.64 14.22
5 55.56 45.19 39.20 32.32 24.98
10 71.43 64.24 59.49 53.20 44.98
Table 1: Participation rate under monopoly for various distributions over risk Beta(a,b).
distribution is symmetric if a = b, positively skewed if a < b and negatively skewed if a > b.
We limit the analysis to the cases of a, b ≥ 1 that ensure a non-decreasing hazard rate.
We have seen that the risk distribution affects the monopoly outcome by changing the
critical level θ∗, while it does not affect the competition equilibrium outcome.
The effect of changing the distribution on the equilibrium monopoly participation rate is
illustrated in Table 1.8 In this Table a Beta distribution (a, b) is used to show that the partici-
pation rate increases with the concentration of the distribution (i.e., simultaneous increase in a
and b). Moreover, participation is higher with negatively skewed distributions (i.e., a−b > 0).
The intuition of the latter result is simple. Consider a small decrease in the skewness of the
distribution such that the effect on f (θ∗) (a second order effect) is negligible. The first order
effect of this change is an increase in 1 − F (θ∗). Then, at θ∗ the monopoly is no longer in
equilibrium since
θ∗h (θ∗) <
1 + α
α
and the firm can increase its profits by increasing the premium charged and, as a consequence,
8Table 1 and the following tables are built assuming α = 1/3, θ = 0 and θ = 0.7.
9
the risk level of the critical type. At the new equilibrium
θ∗∗h (θ∗∗) =
1 + α
α
where θ∗∗ > θ∗, that implies h (θ∗∗) < h (θ∗). Given that the effect on f (θ∗) is negligible, it
follows that the participation rate has increased; i.e., [1− F (θ∗∗)] > [1− F (θ∗)].
Following Rustichini et al. (1994) we measure efficiency in terms of total surplus generated
in the market as a fraction of the first best (full information) surplus.
Table 2 shows the total surplus realized under competition and monopoly as a percentage
of the total surplus under full information. Fixing the degree of risk aversion and the spread
of risks we can compare competition and monopoly for different Beta distributions. The key
result is that except for the uniform distribution (a = b = 1) and distributions for which the
highest risk is the mode (b = 1), monopoly performs better than competition.
b
1 2 3 5 10
a mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp
1 36.00 40.00 25.92 20.00 21.37 11.43 17.05 4.76 13.33 1.10
2 45.57 50.00 35.51 28.57 30.43 17.86 25.20 8.33 20.23 2.20
3 52.58 57.14 43.06 35.71 37.90 23.81 32.22 12.12 26.44 3.57
5 62.21 66.67 54.01 46.67 49.15 33.94 43.34 19.58 36.73 6.86
10 74.79 78.57 69.08 62.86 65.33 51.07 60.34 35.05 53.71 16.15
Table 2: Surplus under monopoly and competition as a percentage of the First Best surplus
for various distributions over risk Beta(a,b).
The difference in performance increases with the concentration and with the skewness
(i.e., as b − a increases). The level of the parameters may marginally affect the ranking
and only in favor of monopoly. An increase in the risk aversion increases the surplus both
under competition and monopoly. Under competition the coverage function δc (θ) =
(
θ/θ
)1/α
is increasing in α; the intuition is that separation becomes easier and a lower difference in
coverage suffices.
Under monopoly, in the equilibrium condition
θ∗h (θ∗) =
1 + α
α
the RHS is decreasing in α and so the equilibrium entails a lower θ∗ and a higher participation
rate. The intuition is that the willingness to pay increases with the risk aversion, and thus
participation can increase with a smaller cut in premium.
It is possible to show with simulations that the ranking between monopoly and competition
is not affected by any value of α ∈ (0, 1).9 On the contrary, a reduction in the spread of
9It is worth recalling that α > 1 means that φ (θ) > 2θ.
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risks
[
θ, θ
]
may alter the ranking in favor of monopoly. Consider, for example, the uniform
distribution case. In this case h (θ) = 1
θ−θ
and the equilibrium condition becomes:
θ∗
θ − θ∗
=
1 + α
α
So, if θ ≥ 1+α1+2αθ, then θ
∗ ≡ θ and all the individuals are provided with full insurance under
monopoly – the first best solution; this result is not possible under competition.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that both monopoly and competition do not implement
neither constrained Pareto-optimal nor second-best allocations in terms of total surplus. On
the one hand, implementable allocations under competition are reduced by the additional set
of zero-profit constraints; on the other hand, monopolist firm maximizes profits rather than
consumers or total surplus. A Pareto-dominant allocation with respect to the monopolist
outcome is simply the allocation that increases the pool of types buying full insurance up to
the point in which the premium paid is equal to the average cost; the allocation obviously
increase total surplus, too. A Pareto-dominant allocation with respect to the competitive
outcome is the one that pools the closest-to-the-highest risk types with the highest risk type
in a full coverage contract up to the point in which the lowest risk in the pool is indifferent
between the new pooling contract and the old competitive equilibrium contract intended for
him, and leaves the same competitive equilibrium contracts to all the other (lower) risk types.10
This new allocation also increases the total surplus generated on the market.
5 Extension to concave probability weighting functions
The aim of this Section is to generalize the result of the previous Sections to the case of non
linear weighting function. We will first identify the monopolist and competitive equilibria,
and then we will analyze their relative efficiency.
The monopolist equilibrium result summarized in Proposition 1 is obtained with the linear
probability weighting function φ (θ) = (1 + α) θ. In the following Proposition we will generalize
the result for any (weakly) concave probability weighting function such that φ (θ) > θ ,
φ′ (θ) > 0 and φ′′ (θ) ≤ 0.
Proposition 3 For any concave probability weighting function φ (θ) , the monopoly market
equilibrium outcome involves a unique θ∗ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
such that
φ (θ∗)− θ∗ =
φ′ (θ∗)
h (θ∗)
(9)
where h(θ) is the non-decreasing hazard function, and the insurance contracts are
{δm (θ) , pim (θ)} = {0, 0} ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ∗]
{δm (θ) , pim (θ)} = {1, φ (θ∗)} ∀θ ∈
[
θ∗, θ
]
10This allocation is always feasible; Riley (2001) shows how reducing the premium of the full coverage contract
(and so attracting more risk types) is always profitable for any continuous distribution.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows therefore that the uniqueness of the contract offered by the monopolist
is not specific to the particular (linear) functional form taken by the probability weighting
function used in this paper, but it is a general result under Yaari’s dual theory of choice under
risk. Attar et al. (2011, Lemma 1) show that the same result is obtained in the context of
nonexclusive contract and it is due to the linearity of the preferences with respect to wealth.11
Shifting to the analysis of competition, the following Proposition generalizes the com-
petitive equilibrium solution of Proposition 2 for any (weakly) concave probability weighting
function.
Proposition 4 For any concave probability weighting function φ (θ) , the competitive equilib-
rium outcome involves the set of contracts
{δc (θ) , pic (θ)} = {δc (θ) , θδc (θ)}
where
δc (θ) = exp−
∫ θ
θ
1
φ(s)− s
ds (10)
Proof. See Appendix
The result that monopoly generally provides higher social surplus than competition is
obtained assuming that individuals have preferences which can be described using the Yaari
dual theory of choice under risk, and assuming a linear probability weighting function. This
choice is useful because it makes surplus comparison more straightforward but it also provides a
benchmark when we want to extend the conclusions to a more general setting with a probability
transformation function φ (θ) such that θ < φ (θ) < 1 and φ′ (θ) > 0 ∀θ. We can in fact
show that whenever the probability weighting function is concave the outcome worsen for
competition with respect to monopoly.
5.1 Linear equivalent of φ(.) that preserves the monopoly equilibrium θ⋆
Assume that the probability transformation function is twice continuously differentiable with
θ < φ (θ) < 1, φ′ (θ) > 0 and φ′′ (θ) < 0 ∀θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
.
Define θ∗ the lowest type buying the full-coverage insurance contract offered by a monop-
olist at the price pi∗ = φ (θ∗). Now define
ψ (θ) = (1 + α∗) θ where α∗ is such that θ∗ =
1 + α∗
α∗h (θ∗)
.
In other words, we are assuming that ψ (θ) is a linear probability transformation function such
that the monopolist optimal contract is the same as with φ(θ). So the same pool of types
θ ∈
[
θ∗, θ
]
buys the full insurance contract offered by the monopolist with both φ (θ) and ψ (θ)
probability transformation functions. The two functions are represented in Figure 3.
11See also Samuelson (1984) and Myerson (1985).
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ΨHΘL
ΦHΘL
Θ
Θ*Θo
1
Figure 3: A concave probability transformation function φ(θ) and the linear function ψ(θ)
which preserves the willingness to pay for θ∗.
It is to be noted that, in order to keep θ∗ constant, it is necessary that ψ(θ∗) > φ(θ∗). This
is easily seen from the monopolist first-order condition associated to probability transformation
functions
ψ (θ∗)− θ∗ =
ψ′ (θ∗)
h (θ∗)
φ (θ∗)− θ∗ =
φ′ (θ∗)
h (θ∗)
Taking difference,
ψ (θ∗)− φ(θ∗) =
ψ′ (θ∗)− φ′ (θ∗)
h (θ∗)
> 0
since by concavity φ′(θ) < ψ′(θ) for all θ to the right of the intersection point ψ
(
θ
◦
)
= φ(θ
◦
).12
Therefore, since ψ(θ) > φ(θ) ∀θ ∈
(
θ
◦
, θ
]
, we have that
∫ θ
θ
1
φ(s)− s
ds >
∫ θ
θ
1
ψ(s)− s
ds ∀θ ∈ [θi, θ]
where θi, if exists, is such that
12It is always the case that θ
◦
< θ∗ because otherwise the monopolist would found profitable to increase the
premium and have a smaller pool of risk types buying insurance.
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∫ θ
θi
1
φ(s)− s
ds =
∫ θ
θi
1
ψ(s)− s
ds
This means that
δc (φ(.), θ) < δc (ψ(.), θ) ∀θ ∈ (θi, θ]
and so the surplus generated in the competitive equilibrium with the linear probability
transformation function ψ(.) is generally much larger than the one generated with the corre-
sponding concave probability transformation function φ(.).13 Therefore, any concave probabil-
ity transformation φ(θ) that preserves the monopoly outcome, reduces the amount of insurance
bought in the competitive equilibrium, and thus generates a lower surplus with competition. In
Figure 4 we represent the monopoly and competitive equilibrium coverage functions obtained
with the probability transformation functions φ(θ) and ψ(θ) used in Figure 3.
∆cHΦH.L,ΘL
∆cHΨH.L,ΘL
Θ*HΦH.LL = Θ*HΨH.LLΘi Θo
1
Figure 4: The monopolist and competitive equilibria obtained with the probability transfor-
mation functions φ(θ) and ψ(θ) used in Figure 3.
The results that competition can hurt efficiency is thus reinforced with a concave proba-
bility weighting function. It is worth noting that the concave probability weighting function is
consistent with a marginal willingness to pay for insurance that is decreasing with the amount
of insurance bought. This is also a central feature of the standard expected utility model.
13Even though the competitive equilibrium does not depend on the distribution of types, θ∗ does, and
therefore the linear transformation ψ(.) depends on the distribution. For all the distributions used in these
paper we found that θi either does not exist or is very small and that the competitive equilibrium surplus with
ψ(.) is much larger than the one with φ(.).
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6 Conclusions
Using the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we contrast the competitive
equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equilibrium outcome a` la Stiglitz (1977) and we
compare their relative efficiency. The main change is that we adopt the dual theory of risk
so that the comparison comes out neatly when dealing with a continuum of types. The dual
theory has the property that utility is linear in income, and risk aversion is expressed entirely
by a transformation of probabilities in which bad outcomes are given relatively higher weights
and good outcomes are given relatively lower weights.
Our main finding is that competition is bad and that the monopoly outcome in general
is more efficient than the competitive outcome (according to our expected efficiency criterion
defined as the fraction of the total surplus that is realized by the market). The reason why
monopoly performs better than competition is that the monopolist can exploit its market
power to relax the incentive constraints. In this paper, following the general view that com-
petition fully separates risk types in equilibrium, we identify the competitive outcome as the
Pareto-dominant full-separating zero-profits set of contracts, which is the (candidate) equilib-
rium according to several approaches including Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Reactive and
Walrasian equilibrium concepts, and the models developed by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002)
and Hellwig (1987). However, an available alternative is the equilibrium concept developed by
Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977), and Spence (1978) (henceforth WMS).14 The WMS equilib-
rium concept allows for cross-subsidization under competition and Crocker and Snow (1985)
show it is always second-best efficient. Therefore the WMS equilibrium always performs better
than the monopolist equilibrium, which is not second-best efficient. This results confirms the
benefits of cross-subsidization in the presence of adverse selection, and our contribution pro-
vides also an additional insight in the debate about competitive equilibria. When competition
allows for cross-subsidization the equilibrium outcome is second-best but, if the competitive
pressure is such that no cross-subsidization can occur, then the outcome is even worse than
the one achieved by a monopoly.
This is one of many examples of the interplay between market imperfections. The economy,
in effect has to trade off between two different imperfections: imperfections of information
or imperfections of competition, with no particular reason that these imperfections will be
balanced optimally.
We expect our result about the inefficiency of competition in insurance markets with
adverse selection to carry over on other markets with adverse selection like the capital market
or the job market.
There is a final remark about the use of the dual theory of risk. With this specification there
is no income effect on the demand of insurance. In contrast, the expected utility approach will
raise the demand for insurance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market
if the absolute risk aversion is decreasing. This is because monopoly price is higher than
14See Netzer and Scheuer (2012) and Mimra and Wambach (2011) for game-theoretic foundation for the
WMS equilibrium.
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competitive price which reduces income and thus raises the marginal willingness to pay for
insurance. It is then expected that moving to the expect utility will further increase the
amount of insurance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market, thereby
reinforcing our conclusion about the inefficiency of competition.
7 Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1 and 3. We will develop the proof using the generic probability
weighting functionφ(θ) and then substitute eventually for the specific weighting function used.
So,
V (θ; δ, pi) = ω − pi − φ(θ)(1− δ)
Because the unique binding IR constraint is for the lowest type:
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) = V (θ; 0, 0) .
The set of incentive constraints implies that
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈[θ,θ]
V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ)) ∀ θ, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ] with θˆ 6= θ
the first order condition for the type θ is:
∂V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ))
∂θˆ
=
∂
∂θˆ
[ω − pi(θˆ)− φ(θ)(1− δ(θˆ))]
= φ(θ)δ′(θˆ)− pi′(θˆ) = 0
which evaluated at θˆ = θ gives the local incentive compatibility conditions (LIC)
φ(θ)δ′(θ)− pi′(θ) = 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ] (11)
Moreover, the necessary LIC is also sufficient condition when the utility function satisfies the
increasing differences property,
∂2V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ))
∂θˆ∂θ
= φ′(θ)δ′(θˆ) ≥ 0
which requires the coverage to be monotonically increasing δ′(θ) ≥ 0, whenever φ′(θ) > 0.15
Define the value function of the maximization problem evaluated at the truth-telling equi-
librium:
U(θ) = V (θ; δ(θ), pi(θ)) = ω − φ(θ)(1− δ(θ))− pi(θ) (12)
differentiating with respect to θ
U ′(θ) = −φ′(θ)(1− δ(θ)) + φ(θ)δ′(θ)− pi′(θ)
= −φ′(θ)(1− δ(θ)) < 0 (13)
15Throughout the paper we assume that φ′(θ) > 0 so that the single crossing property holds for any θ ∈ [θ, θ].
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where the second equality follows from (11).
Using these results we can rewrite the maximization programme of the monopolist as
follows:
max
π(θ),δ(θ)
∫ θ
θ
[pi(θ)− δ(θ)θ]dF (θ)
subject to
δ′(θ) ≥ 0
φ(θ)δ′(θˆ)− pi′(θˆ) = 0
V (θ; δ(θ);pi(θ)) ≥ V (θ; 0, 0)
Ignoring for the moment the monotonicity constraint that will be checked later, we can rewrite
the objective function after substituting the constraints in it. From the definition of the value
function (12)
pi(θ) = ω − φ(θ)(1− δ(θ))− U(θ) (14)
and by equation (13)
U(θ) = U(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
−φ′(s)(1− δ(s))ds
By using the binding constraint for the low type,
U(θ) = ω − φ(θ)− φ(θ) + φ(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)ds
= ω − φ(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)ds (15)
Substituting this expression into (14):
pi(θ) = ω − φ(θ)(1− δ(θ))− ω + φ(θ)−
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)ds
= φ(θ)δ(θ)−
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)ds (16)
This expression for the insurance premium captures both the incentive and participation
constraints. Plugging this premium in the objective function we get the reduced problem:
max
δ(θ)
∫ θ
θ
[
φ(θ)δ(θ)− δ(θ)θ −
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)ds
]
dF (θ)
The second term is the aggregate informational rent which integrating by parts is given by
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)dsdF (θ) =
∣∣∣∣
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)dsF (θ)
∣∣∣∣
θ
θ
−
∫ θ
θ
φ′(θ)δ(θ)F (θ)dθ
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with ∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)ds = 0
F (θ) = 0
F (θ) = 1
Hence: ∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
φ′(s)δ(s)dsdF (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
φ′(θ)δ(θ)dθ −
∫ θ
θ
φ′(θ)δ(θ)F (θ)dθ
=
∫ θ
θ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
φ′(θ)δ(θ)dF (θ)
Plugging the solution for the informational rent into the objective function
max
δ(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ
θ
[
φ(θ)δ(θ)− δ(θ)θ −
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
φ′(θ)δ(θ)
]
dF (θ)
Let h(θ) = f(θ)1−F (θ) be the hazard rate, then the monopoly programme is
max
δ(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ
θ
δ(θ)
[
φ(θ)− θ −
φ′(θ)
h (θ)
]
dF (θ) (17)
Because the objective is maximized when the argument of the integral is maximized ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]
the result of Proposition 3 is obtained.
Furthermore, by substituting φ(θ) with (1 + α)θ, the monopolist problem (17) becomes
max
δ(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ
θ
δ(θ)
[
αθ −
1− α
h (θ)
]
dF (θ)
and the result of Proposition 1 is proven.
It remains to check the monotonicity constraint. To be verified, it requires that
∂2
∂δ(θ)∂θ
[
(φ(θ)− θ) δ(θ)−
φ′(θ)
h (θ)
δ(θ)
]
≥ 0
With a linear probability transformation function, it simplifies to
h′(θ)
h2(θ)
≥ −
α
1 + α
and a sufficient condition is that the hazard rate is non-decreasing in the interval [θ, θ], which
completes the proof.
With a general probability transformation function, in addition to the monotonicity of
the hazard rate, the following sufficient condition ensures the monotonicity of the coverage
function:
φ′ (θ) > 1 + φ′′ (θ)h (θ) (18)
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Proof of Propositions 2 and 4. From the zero profit conditions (7) it follows that the
participation constraints (2) are not binding and can be disregarded.
Following the incentive compatibility approach of Mailath (1987) the set (3) can be rewrit-
ten as the maximization programme of agents
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈[θ,θ]
V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ)) ∀ θ, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ]
By the zero profit condition (7), every agent with risk θ is facing actuarially fair premium:
pi(θ) = δ(θ)θ. This can be incorporated in the local incentive compatibility condition for the
type θ that has been derived in equation (11) in the proof of Propositions 1-3, which now
becomes:16
φ(θ)δ′(θ)− δ(θ)− θδ′(θ) = 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ] (19)
Hence the equilibrium coverage rate function δ(θ) is the solution to the following differential
equation,
δ′(θ)
δ(θ)
=
1
φ(θ)− θ
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] (20)
Let r(θ) = 1φ(θ)−θ . The differential equation can be solved as follows. Integrating the LHS
yields ∫
δ′(θ)
δ(θ)
dθ = log δ(θ) + c1
while integrating the RHS yields
R(θ) =
∫
r(θ)dθ
Then, taking exponential on both sides gives
δ(θ) = keR(θ)
where k is the constant of integration. Using the no distortion at the top condition, we have
the terminal condition, δ(θ) = 1, so that
δ(θ) = keR(θ) = 1 =⇒ k = e−R(θ)
So, the unique solution is
δc(θ) = eR(θ)−R(θ)
where R(θ) − R(θ) = −
∫ θ
θ r(s)ds, which completes the proof of Proposition 4. To prove
Proposition 1 requires to use the linear probability transformation function φ(θ) = (1 + α)θ
16As before, the necessary LIC is also sufficient condition when coverage function is monotonically increasing.
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and so:
r(θ) =
1
φ(θ)− θ
=
1
αθ
R(θ) =
∫
1
φ(θ)− θ
dθ = log θ
1
α
eR(θ) = θ
1
α
eR(θ) = θ
1
α
Therefore
δc (θ) = eR(θ)−R(θ) =
(
θ/θ
) 1
α ∈ [0, 1] ∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ]
By the zero profit condition the equilibrium premium function is
pic (θ) = δc (θ) θ =
(
θ1+α
θ
) 1
α
∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ]
Since the coverage function is increasing in θ, the second order condition is respected, which
completes the proof of Proposition 2.17
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